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Introduction and summary of conclusions 
 
The 1994 Fiscal Reforms in China were spectacularly successful in meeting the 
immediate challenges that the economy faced at that time—a sharply dropping 
tax/GDP ratio, and limited ability of the central government to conduct 
macroeconomic or redistributive policies. The centerpiece of the reform was the 
VAT to be administered by the newly established State Administration of Taxation. 
Agreement for the reforms by the provinces was not easy—an involved 
guaranteeing 1993 levels of revenues, a share of the revenues from the VAT to 
benefit the high income regions, an equalization system for the less well to do 
regions, which was to receive more resources over time. The most interesting 
element was the “revenue-return,” which was ostensibly disequalizing but had the 
advantage of protecting the growth centers along the coast, and was a key element 
in providing continuing employment opportunities to migrant workers, leading to a 
sharp drop in poverty and rapidly increasing living standards. 
 
At the time, recommendations based on normative intergovernmental theory 
suggested that spending assignments should be addressed before the revenue-side. 
However, the 1994 reforms reversed the order, given the gravity of the overall 
macroeconomic situation, as discussed below in Section 1, and the realization that 
the reform of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and transferring their 
responsibilities to local governments would take time. This is illustrative of the 
“political economy” approach to intergovernmental issues (Ahmad and Brosio, 
2006). 
 
The 1993/4 reforms were partial in that the focus was on the tax system and 
revenue sharing arrangements, and the budget system reforms and spending 
assignments were not addressed at that time. Even the VAT was not of the standard 
consumption-type and did not cover the full base. The production type VAT time did 
not provide refunds or crediting for VAT on capital inputs, and in principle was 
worse for exporters than the normal consumption-type VAT that typically provides 
such credits and refunds. Yet the production-type VAT generated revenues in a 
relatively efficient manner, and export-led growth continued unabated. 
 
There have been incremental reforms since 1994 to the tax assignments, 
including recently a conversion of the VAT to the standard consumption-type 
(although not yet to services because of the need to replace the local business tax); 
rationalization and consolidation of the corporate income tax (CIT); and moving the 
personal income tax to SAT administration.  Both the recent VAT and CIT reforms 
will be initially revenue-losing, although the rationalization should lead to expanded 
production and the overall effect may be revenue-neutral. Yet current overall 
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revenues are likely insufficient if future spending needs are examined, including for 
basic social spending, given the ageing of the population, and also infrastructure 
needs commensurate with China’s status as a leading nation (both revenues and 
spending are well below OECD averages). This is part of a medium-term agenda for 
reforms. 
 
More importantly and immediately, local governments lack appropriate own-
sources of revenues, and have relied increasingly on land sales and indirect 
borrowing to meet their spending needs, which are in turn nebulous. A tightening of 
the budget and treasury systems (mandating the use of the Treasury Single Account 
system and injunctions on off-budget operations from the current year—although 
the effectiveness of the latter has yet to be determined) may lead to increasing 
reliance on indirect mechanisms to borrow for local investments in urban areas, 
since formal borrowing remains prohibited under the budget law.   
 
While there is growing local indebtedness,1 including through bonds issued 
on their behalf by the central government, local government financing vehicles 
(LGFVs)2 or by local Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDICs), local 
governments have few incentives or resources to service the debt, or be held 
accountable for it.  Banking regulators are reported to be planning to shift some of 
these loans to separate asset management companies and also write off some debts. 
While this is sensible, the incentive problems leading to the buildup of debt cannot 
be solved without addressing the root causes—this will involve a set of interlocking 
measures to enhance local government accountability. This is a short-run priority. 
 
The short run agenda 
 
The short-term agenda must include measures to address the issue of risks 
emanating from local government operations, as well as the imbalances in the 
development and growth patterns, as recognized in the government’s medium term 
strategy. Some of the key measures include 
1. An urgent reform of the organic budget law: 
a. This would permit bond issues subject to preconditions; with 
asymmetric applications likely—especially in the more advanced 
metropolitan areas; 
b. Other areas that do not qualify for bond issues would have less 
autonomy: and would continue to rely on direct central support for 
investment. 
                                                        
1 Recent information released by the PBC puts the extent of local indebtedness at 
around 30 percent of total Yuan loans, or around Y14.4 trillion, or around 36 
percent of GDP. (Peoples Bank of China, 2011). 
2 The LGFVs increased by 25% from end 2008 to over 10,000 by end 2010. 
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2. The regions (provinces/third tier administrations) able to utilize bond issues 
must be able to supplement shared revenues and transfers by own-source 
revenues.  
a. This could be based on a piggy-back on the income tax, which could be 
introduced quickly for the provinces. 
b. The property tax would become the central own-source revenue for 
qualifying third tier administrations. The base of the tax, and its 
applications would need to be expanded from the current 
experimentations in two metropolitan areas. 
c. “Green taxes” can also be introduced quickly and become an 
instrument that governs incentives for local governments as well as 
producers.   
 
3. Improved information flows; risk management and enhanced coordination of 
overall debt and liabilities are critical.  
a. As seen in Europe, private sector liabilities, including those of 
property developers, could become a public sector burden, and must 
be carefully monitored. 
b. The current tightening by the MOF of the off-budget operations of 
local governments is critical, and effective management requires that 
there should be full and complete disclosure of local government 
operations. 
 
The medium-term objectives 
 
In the medium-term, it will be important to build on the solid foundations provided 
by the 1994 reforms, as China aims to consolidate its position as one of the leading 
economies of the world. This will require additional efforts in the areas of  (1) tax 
reforms; (2) spending assignments; (3) transfer design; as well as (4) further 
developing the risk and debt management strategy described above, including also 
greater interregional coordination and monitoring as well as strengthening of the 
on-going public financial management reforms. 
 
1. Tax reforms:  
a. This will involve principally the development of the personal income 
tax, as well as the property tax for the third tier, as well as modified 
sharing arrangements.  
b. The VAT reforms should be completed with the replacement of the 
local business tax. 
c. A number of more efficient sharing mechanisms are possible, as the 
origin based sharing becomes more complicated to operate with 
problematic crediting and refund mechanisms across local 
governments. Similarly, sharing of the corporate income tax on the 
basis of location becomes more complicated as firms establish multi-
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jurisdictional operations. New sharing arrangements need further 
work. 
2. Spending assignments: 
a. It will be important to work on the spending assignments—this will 
largely involve the clarification of responsibilities between the 
“responsible” second and third tiers of government that are capable 
of having own-source revenues and credit ratings.  
b. Work needs to continue to rationalize social insurance at the 
appropriate level for pooling of risks, as well as the links with 
efficient financing arrangements. 
3. Further development of the transfer system, the main elements of which 
were established in 1994: 
a. The authorities need to decide whether to establish equalization for 
both the second and third tiers—this may be important in 
rebalancing the economy. 
b. The design and operation of special purpose transfers needs to be 
examined, especially a greater focus on monitoring of outcomes and 
using this as the basis for grant allocations in an intertemporal 
framework. The development of the budget management system 
should facilitate this extension of the transfer system. 
4. The development of the credit allocation mechanism will take time, but the 
asymmetric possibilities suggest that the reforms could be initiated quickly 
in some of the more advanced metropolitan areas, and extended as quickly 
as the public financial management systems permit. The short-term reforms 
of the budget process become critical. 
 
To recapitulate, the components of a new fiscal strategy should build on the 
political economy approach that was displayed in the 1994 reforms. The new 
reforms are likely to include a deepening of the tax reforms initiated in 1994, 
reconsideration of spending assignments, strengthening of budget system reforms 
including the management of sub-national risks and liabilities, and more effective 
operation of the equalization mechanisms that were initiated in 1994, but that need 
to be fully implemented in order to assure the balanced growth envisaged in the 12th 
Five Year plan, and in the medium-term context. The new framework should 
provide incentives to better address existing imbalances in the economy at all levels, 
and to prepare it to meet developed country challenges during the course of the 
next plan period. Thus, while the 1994 reforms remain a good basis for the current 
success, the further developments identified here are critical in maintaining China’s 
development trajectory and rebalancing the benefits of growth. 
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I. Chinese Strategy for Fiscal Reforms 
 
 
Chinese fiscal policy and institutions have tended to be “reactive” to changes in 
economic strategy, often with significant lags. While this has not always been 
consistent with established standards, the sequencing has reflected an 
understanding of the political economy constraints and considerations that was 
appropriate in the Chinese context.  An example of this was with the economic 
reforms of the early 1980s that unleashed the astonishing growth impetus that has 
been in evidence since then.  
 
A key component of the reforms was the shift from the command economy 
system of 100 percent taxation of profits of state owned enterprises and collectives 
to a lower 33 percent, and the establishment of “special economic zones” as well as 
preferential rates for foreign owned companies to attract foreign direct investment. 
A Fiscal Responsibility System (FRS) was established in 1985 that permitted local 
governments to keep revenues above a stipulated amount—it was argued that this 
led to incentives for market-preserving federalism.3 These measures, however, led 
to a precipitous drop in the Chinese tax to GDP ratio, as well as the central 
government share of these revenues. The latter was due to the fact that the 
administration of taxes was in the hand of local governments, which did not have an 
incentive to share a shrinking pie with the central government. The amounts due to 
be remitted to the center could be reduced by investing in local industries, e.g., 
through various exemptions. Another element was due to the ability of local 
governments to place resources in extra-budgetary funds that did not have to be 
shared with the center. 4 
 
The situation for the central government, by 1992, was quite dire. The 
central government was quite restricted its ability to conduct macroeconomic policy 
or any meaningful redistribution (see Figure 1). 
 
The 1994 reforms 
 
The 1994 reforms that also established the State Administration of Taxation, and a 
new tax sharing system with the VAT as its core, led to a significant change in the 
revenue to GDP ratio, as well as the position of the central government   (see Figure 
2). The turnaround in the public finances was immediate, showing the power of a 
central tax administration to redress incentives to withhold revenues from the 
center, as well as a more effective tax system, largely due to the imposition of a VAT. 
 
 
                                                        
3 Jin, Qiang and Weingast 2005, and also Qian and Weingast, 1996. 
4 See Wong 2000, and Husain and Stern 2008. 
 8 
 
Note:     The graphs represent trends in tax revenues. 
Source: China: Statistical Yearbook, Various Years, Ahmad 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Note:     The ratios are relative to total (central and local) revenues and spending. 
Source: China: Statistical Yearbook, 2009 
 
Figure 1. China: Revenue, 1980-2005
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A political economy compromise was needed in order to “persuade” 
provinces to relinquish tax space to the central “State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT)”. This involved several elements to ensure that no province would lose from 
the reforms (a lump-sum component to assure that the 1993 levels of revenues 
would be maintained in nominal terms (this would decline over time); a share in the 
revenues of the new taxes (especially the VAT), and an additional albeit slowly 
declining “revenue-returned” over and above the lump-sum and revenue-shares. A 
key component of the reforms was an equalization framework based on 
international best practice (standardized assessments of revenue capacities and 
spending needs), but the amounts allocated for equalization would be increased 
gradually. 5 
 
It was recognized at the outset that additional tax reforms would be needed 
over time. Given the pressing revenue needs, the VAT implemented in 1994 was of 
the investment type, i.e., with no credit given for investment and capital goods. This 
introduced distortions, but it was felt that the adjustments could be made over time.  
 
Similarly, the authorities did not attempt to solve all issues with the 
corporate income tax with the 1994 reforms—which were designed to consolidate 
the taxation of Chinese-owned firms. These firms were subjected to the Interim 
regulations on Enterprise Income Tax 1993; #137—which consolidated the Interim 
SOE income tax (1984); SOE income regulatory tax (1984) and interim Collective 
Enterprise Income Tax (1985) and the Interim Private enterprise income tax 
(1988). Foreign firms continued to be subjected to the Foreign Investment 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises Income Tax (1991); #45. 6  
 
Administration by ownership type was continued—with local 
administrations continuing to administer the enterprise income tax on local firms, 
and the SAT administering the others. This helped to “sell” the idea of a SAT to the 
provinces. Moreover, differential regimes of corporate income tax between foreign 
and Chinese owned firms were maintained, together with generous tax incentives 
for the former—largely to encourage foreign investment. Despite the common 
nominal statutory rate of 33 percent, the effective rate for the foreign firms was at 
least 10 percentage points lower.7 An agenda for corporate income tax reforms 
remained, even after the significant advances made in 1993. 
 
Assessment 
 
The main objectives of the 1994 reform were achieved quite quickly, as seen in 
Figure 1. The overall tax to GDP ratio increased rapidly. And the central share of the 
total increased to the levels expected in the 1980s, before the responsibility system 
                                                        
5 See Ahmad (2008), Wang and Lou Jiwei (2008). 
6 See Brean (1998). 
7 Li, Jinyan (2007). 
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distorted local government incentives, and has remained at that level since—
affecting the ability of the center to “redistribute resources” and to conduct an active 
regional policy. 
 
The composition of the transfer system after the 1994 reforms is shown in 
Table 1. The “revenue-returns” are seen as a major component, and we return to 
this issue below as it played a major role in the political economy compromise to get 
the reforms initiated and to ensure that the twin objectives of growth and 
employment generation in the aggregate would be maintained—albeit at the cost of 
exacerbating regional inequalities. 
 
 
Table 1 Composition of total central transfers after 1994 reforms 
 
 Share of total 
transfers from the 
center 
(in percent) 
Total transfers 100 
Revenue returned 48.9 
Old system 2.7 
Equalization transfers 17.9 
Specific purpose 30.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
 
 
Intergovernmental concerns, particularly bringing on board the provinces 
was part of the political economy solution that was so well designed by the Chinese 
authorities in 1994. The equalization framework was commensurate with best 
practices, yet the amounts available for redistribution were limited. More resources 
were allocated for the gradually declining “revenue returns” (Ahmad, 2008).  
 
Several distinguished commentators have criticized the overall transfer 
system as being “regressive”. 8 In a static sense, the criticisms are valid, in that more 
resources were being channeled to the richer coastal regions than the poorer 
interior (Figure 3).  The transfers, together with revenue shares, also probably 
accentuated regional inequalities in public spending (Figure 4), although population 
                                                        
8 See e.g., Hofman and Yusuf (1995), Husain and Stern (2008) and Qiao, Martinez-
Vasquez and Xu (2008). 
 11 
movements within China likely moderated the effects on households—leading to 
lower overall poverty and unemployment—the main concerns of the policy makers.  
 
Thus, in a dynamic sense, the authorities were probably right in their 
assessment and policy design—for two reasons. This included the pace of SOE 
reforms as well as the structure and operations of the labour market—in particular 
the “floating workers.” 
 
First, the main concern of the Chinese government was to avoid major 
disruptions in production patterns, and aggregate employment generation potential. 
This meant that resources could not be suddenly diverted from the regions that 
were benefitting from growth and investment in the mid-1990s. Together with a 
relaxation of internal migration rules, the “floating population” of migrant workers 
probably played a significant role in the reduction of rural poverty, despite the fact 
that resources continued to be allocated to the coastal regions, and may have 
accentuated interregional inequalities. Yet this was a rational policy response, in 
keeping with the impressive political economy calculus of the 1994 reforms. 
 
The second reason was that in 1994 the Chinese government did not have 
the time to address the spending assignment issue—despite the prescriptions of 
traditional theoretical constructs of intergovernmental finance. This was because it 
was decided that the disentangling of social responsibilities of the SOEs would not 
be undertaken overnight, especially given the political reactions that had been seen 
in a “big bang approach” to this issue in the USSR. Without this disentanglement, 
addressing the spending assignments in 1994 would have been meaningless, and 
was not attempted despite some earnest advice to do so. 
 
The situation now has changed, both vis a vis SOE reforms, local government 
responsibilities, and the labour employment potential of the interior. Thus, a more 
balanced and equitable approach can now be undertaken without danger of 
upsetting the apple cart. We turn now to the components of what could be the case 
for a 1994 redux. 
 
The main consequence of the 1994 reforms has been a “recentralization” on 
the revenue side (Ahmad, Li and Richardson, 2001). This has increased the vertical 
imbalances between the center and the sub-national entities, at the same time that 
there has been a further increase in the sub-national spending responsibilities.  The 
resulting pressure on sub-national finances in general, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. In 
combination with tighter budgetary controls (see below) that have blocked off some 
of the mechanisms for local government flexibility, including extra-budgetary 
sources of finance, the increasing pressures are in evidence in newer and less well 
regulated policy tools, such as indirect access to credit.  
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Figure 3   Overall transfers across provinces, circa 2000 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Regional disparities in provincial per capita spending, circa 2000 
 
Source: Ahmad, Fortuna and Singh 2004. 
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The revenue-sharing mechanisms have exacerbated the sub-national difficulties 
in an uneven manner—across, and likely within provinces.9 
II. Gradual Reforms since 1994 
 
Fiscal challenges in an international perspective  
Since 1994, the Chinese government has undertaken some basic reforms to 
strengthen their toolkit of fiscal instruments that puts them in a much better 
position to address the challenges of dealing with an increasingly sophisticated and 
complex economy that now rivals the most advanced in the world. Yet, the 
challenges of dealing with the new realities are significant, and there are substantial 
gaps and challenges on both the revenue and spending sides that would need to be 
addressed as part of a coordinated strategy over the medium-term. 
 
While the 1994 reforms dramatically improved China’s overall revenue 
position relative to the immediate past, the domestic resource mobilization effort is 
far short of levels in the industrialized, as well as in the advanced transition 
countries (see Table 2). The social contract in these countries is at least as 
encompassing as that in a “xiaokang society”, and the patterns of an ageing of the 
population are not dissimilar. Thus, one would expect much higher spending on 
health care as well as education in the future, in addition to the current emphasis on 
infrastructure, and there would be a need to mobilize commensurate additional 
resources. 
 
China does fairly well in the comparisons with other advanced countries in 
relation to the VAT/taxation of goods and services. The big differences are in 
relation to the income taxes, as well as property taxes and the whole area of sub-
national own-source revenues, and this suggests areas in which further efforts may 
be needed in China.  
 
Of course, the aggregate picture hides key elements in the level of provision 
and financing of public spending in the advanced countries and in China. The first 
related to sub-national own-revenues and accountability in the level of provision. In 
the advanced countries, even those that are unitary, there tends to be at least one 
major revenue source over which the lower levels have some control, usually of the 
rate (administration does not have to be at the same level for the definition of own-
source revenues to apply). Note that revenue shares are like transfers—the local 
government cannot vary these, and hence these are generally not sufficient in 
addressing the ability or the incentives of the local government to repay debt, for 
example. In China, much of the local revenues are generated through shared taxes, 
                                                        
9 It has not been possible to examine the changes that might have occurred within 
and across provinces, some of which are considerably larger than most 
decentralized countries in the UN. 
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or taxes over which the local jurisdiction has little or no control, and hence one can 
say that this is an area that needs to be examined further not just in the context of 
the tax reforms, but also in examining the scope for local hard budget constraints, 
and effective management of sub-national liabilities and debt (these issues are 
discussed further below). 
 
 
Table 2 Chinese public finances in international perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
A second major difference between China and most of the advanced 
countries relates to pensions and social insurance.  In most of the latter, pensions 
are treated as part of a national commitment, involving as it does, both interactions 
between generations, as well as across jurisdictions. The pooling of inter-temporal 
risk is enhanced when the actions are undertaken at the national level. In the 
Chinese case, these responsibilities were devolved from the enterprises to the local 
governments in the initial stages of the reforms, and have remained largely local in 
scope. Although national pooling was recommended by a World Bank mission as far 
back as 1989,10 even pooling at the provincial level has proved to be difficult to 
achieve, and remains an objective for the current five year plan.  
 
The absence of own-source tax handles for local governments, combined 
with the increasing devolution of spending responsibilities, and inability to 
rationalize spending that should normally be the responsibility of higher levels—
especially involving the pooling of risks, such as for pensions or unemployment 
                                                        
10 See World Bank 1990. 
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benefits has led the local governments to greater reliance on operations involving 
land. Given the “grey” property rights in China, local governments have been able to 
“exploit” loopholes, exploit tenants especially in adjoining rural areas. A significant 
incentive is the ability of local governments to leverage such assets for spending 
purposes that tend to be off-budget, and off the radar of higher levels of 
government.  
 
Part of the problem has been that, as the budget process has been tightened, 
the sources of funds at the discretion or control of the local governments have 
dwindled, and there is a reluctance to lose the remaining resources—these include 
pensions, as well as the funds now being collected under the Urban Development 
Investment Corporations (UDICs).  International experience suggests that clarity in 
spending responsibilities; together with appropriate own-source revenues; are 
critical in engendering incentives for improved governance at the sub-national level. 
Tax reforms 
 
Since 1994, some of the main deficiencies with the VAT and the Income Taxes have 
been addressed, and experimental work has been initiated with respect to resource 
taxation and property taxes. However, these have been stand-alone reforms without 
the adjustments in the transfer system that accompanied the 1994 reforms, and are 
likely to have had a differential impact on the allocation of resources across 
provinces given the revenue-sharing arrangements. 
1. VAT 
 
The VAT was initially designed as investment-type, with no credit or refunds being 
allowed on purchases of capital goods. This discriminates against domestic firms 
relative to imports. This arrangement was used largely to maximize revenues, but 
did not affect greatly the export-potential. Recently, the VAT has been moved to a 
consumption-type arrangement, implying that purchases of capital goods would be 
allowed to be credited against VAT liabilities on the sales of goods by firms. This is 
in line with international experiences, and reduces distortions against domestic 
firms. As the exchange rate has appreciated, it became imperative that this 
distortion affecting exports should be removed. 
 
The move to a consumption-type VAT is not revenue-neutral and would have 
reduced the overall take from the VAT. Moreover, the impact of the revenue losses 
would be felt in a random manner by provinces, being the highest in the middle- 
income provinces (see Figure 5 for a simulated estimation of losses). Interestingly, 
the richest provinces, Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong, do not do badly in terms of 
this reform, losing on average less than 10 percent of their VAT share. 
 
Of course, the VAT reform agenda is not complete, and comes into direct 
interplay with subnational finances in its final stage—when and if the business tax is 
replaced by the VAT. Again, there is a differential pattern of gainers and losers, and a 
 16 
compensation mechanism similar to that devised in 1994 may be needed again, and 
it is clear that this final stage can only be implemented as part of a broader reform. 
Figure 6 illustrates the relative losses for provinces. Again, the richest provinces do 
not lose as much as those in the middle—the interior provinces. Of course, in this 
case, there is no overall revenue loss, indeed the central revenues increase 
substantially—and a mechanism could be devised to compensate the losing 
provinces, either through a change in the sharing percentages, or through the 
equalization transfer system. The establishment of a complex dual VAT system, such 
as in Canada, could be considered in the longer term, but for the moment the 
Australian mechanism of using the equalization framework to provide resources to 
the provinces may be appropriate.11 
 
 
Figure  5  Percentage revenue losses from the C-VAT reforms 
 
 
 Source: Ahmad (2008), Ahmad, Lockwood and Singh (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 However, unlike the Australian case, it is not likely that 100 percent of the VAT in 
China would need to be allocated to finance the equalization system. 
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Figure 6.  Final stage of the VAT reform—provincial losses 
 
 
Source: Ahmad, Lockwood and Singh (2005); Ahmad (2008). 
 
 
2. The Corporate Income Tax 
 
The principles underlying the reform of the income tax were understood at the 
outset in the 1994 reform—creating a level playing field for all firms irrespective of 
the sources of financing.12 But it was clear that the implementation would have to be 
gradual, and there was a need for maintaining incentives for foreign investment, in 
particular. The 2007 legislation created this level playing field by introducing a 
uniform tax rate of 25 percent for all enterprises, and removing most of the 
exemptions and incentives that were available to foreign investors.  Unified and 
clear rules govern the remaining incentives that are available to all investors 
provided they fulfil the criteria. This simplifies the legislation and administration, 
and provides greater transparency to the investors (Li 2007). 
 
                                                        
12 For a full description of the basis of the 1994 reforms, and the longer-term 
objectives on the tax side, see Xu and Lin (1995). 
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The new tax rate is close to the effective tax rate for the foreign enterprises, 
and does not increase the taxation of foreign enterprises or investors. However, the 
reform reduced the effective tax rate on domestic enterprises and generated a 
windfall for Chinese companies, including the state owned enterprises.  
 
In general, the lower corporate tax rate should not be a problem, as it 
permits firms to take rational decisions concerning investments, and creates the 
incentives for greater efficiency in decision-making. The issue of “excessive” SOE 
profits, which could be a transitional consequence, should not be addressed through 
a “mandatory” transfer, which would become a tax in disguise and thus negate the 
spirit of the 2007 legislation.  
 
The appropriate mechanism to deal with “excessive profits” may well be a more 
active involvement by the management boards of the enterprises that would 
determine the extent of reinvestment, retained profits, and dividends to the owners 
(central or local governments) on a case-by-case basis. The more flexible 
arrangements regarding dividend transfers would supplement a simple sharing 
arrangement of the CIT between different levels of government. This mechanism 
would protect the interests of all the concerned parties: firms, central and local 
governments. 
 
3. Personal income tax 
 
As incomes rise in China, the personal income tax (PIT) will become a more 
significant source for revenues, as it is in the more advanced countries.  Much of the 
gap in the potential revenue raising capacities between China and other developed 
countries will be closed through the more effective design and implementation of 
the PIT. This tax is also a key instrument to deal with inequalities in personal 
incomes—as this has now become a priority for the leadership and the current plan. 
Finally, the PIT also provides a convenient handle to provide “own-source revenues” 
to provinces, in the sense of potential setting of their preferred rate within a 
specified range even if administration continues with the SAT. 
 
Appropriately, the PIT is no longer a local tax, as it was in 1994. However, 
converting the PIT into a shared tax, with no control for the local governments over 
the rate structure at the margin, converts the provincial shares into the equivalent 
of another transfer from the center, and not an “own-source” tax as defined above—
in the sense that the local government has neither control over the rates or base of 
the tax. This reduces incentives for the local government to assist the SAT, e.g., in 
providing information. 
 
With a piggy-backing arrangement for the PIT, where there is an additional 
room for setting the provincial rate (say up to 5 percentage points) above the 
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central PIT rate and collected by SAT,13 the tax would constitute effective own-
revenues of the provincial government. Moreover, there is a greater incentive for a 
local government to assist with the administration and provision of information to 
maximize its resources. Further, a ratings agency could examine the effectiveness 
with which the local income tax base is being utilized, and the rates adopted at the 
margin by the local government in meeting its obligations. 
 
A piggy-backed PIT sharing arrangement would have similar effects on the 
regional allocation of resources as the straightforward sharing arrangement. Indeed, 
a standardized approach to revenue capacities would not “correct” for the 
effectiveness with which the local revenue base is utilize—so as not to penalize the 
more efficient local governments. Indeed, with the standardized approach, 
incorporated in the Chinese equalization framework, there are incentives for local 
governments to enhance the use of their revenue assignments. The difficulty is that 
the local governments have few, if any, own-source revenues assigned, so the 
incentive in the transfers system is not currently effectively utilized. 
4. Property tax experiments 
 
Property tax experiments are being initiated at the large city level (Shanghai and 
Chongqing). The main focus appears to be to put a brake on spiralling property 
valuations and speculation more than raising revenues or providing a tax-handle to 
the local government. In Shanghai, the base is the assessed value, which is now 
calculated based on the related market prices. Shanghai Government established a 
standardized property information management system that apparently includes 
information on the cadaster and market values.14 In Chongqing, the base is 
apparently historical trading prices. A shift to the market-valuation may be possible 
in the future. 
 
If there is eventually a constituency for a modern property tax at the 
municipal (third tier of local governments), considerable work will be needed to 
establish a cadaster, mechanisms for valuation, establishment of a rate structure 
and administration, as well as the recording of property transactions and updates of 
valuation. The current experiments in Shanghai and Chongqing should provide a 
useful basis for further expansion.  
 
This reform could usefully be linked to a rationalization of “executive” levels 
of government that could be held responsible for the delivery of their assigned 
services—with clearly assigned spending and own-source revenues. Thus, if there 
                                                        
13 In some unitary countries, the tax base is determined by the center, and the range 
for provincial tax “piggy-back” is also legislated at the center. The payments due to 
the local government could be made directly to the local Treasury Single Account 
(TSA), or routed through the central TSA. 
14 Communication from the Ministry of Finance, PRC, February 28, 2011. 
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were three levels of government, the property (or land) tax could be assigned to the 
third tier—roughly corresponding to municipalities or counties. 
Transfer design 
 
The “political economy” innovation of the 1994 reforms lay in the linkages between 
the tax reforms and the transfers that helped to “persuade” provinces to cooperate 
in a significant shift in the power to collect taxes. There were different components 
(as shown in Table 1)—including the “lump-sum” for 1993 level allocations; that 
would gradually become insignificant over time; revenue-sharing to provide 
resources to the provinces that generate revenues, as well as a greater focus on 
equalization that would benefit provinces with higher spending costs and needs as 
well as more meager revenue bases. Special purpose transfers were also instituted, 
and the infrastructure deficiencies in the interior and poorer provinces were 
targeted. As mentioned above, a “revenue-returned” component was also 
introduced, designed to decline over time, but principally to ensure that there would 
be no abrupt shift in the pattern of investment that might adversely affect growth 
prospects or employment opportunities. 
 
Table 3 shows the shifting patterns of the transfer system over time. We see 
that the objectives of the 1994 reforms have been largely met. In particular, the 
revenue returned that formed almost three quarters of the transfers in 1996, was 
down to 17.3 percent by 2009. The equalization transfers that were 10 percent in 
1996, now form almost 40 percent. Central government earmarked transfers that 
jumped from 18 percent in 1996 to almost 50 percent, with the government’s 
emphasis on meeting infrastructure gaps in the interior, have fallen to 43 percent by 
the end of the decade.  
 
The effects of the transfer system can be seen in relation to the spending and 
revenue patterns in the provinces—Figure 7 shows the picture based on the most 
recent data available for 2008. While there are clearly significant differences in per 
capita income across Chinese provinces, with Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin forming 
the “outliers” so to speak (above Y 50,000 per capita), and the other Eastern 
provinces forming the “second” tier (mainly between Y 30,000 to Y 40,000 per 
capita) and the interior provinces (mainly below Y 20,000 per capita).  Shanghai and 
Beijing are also outliers in terms of revenues, and correspondingly in terms of 
equivalent spending. If these are excluded, the provinces with the highest per-capita 
spending are Tibet, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Xingiang, and all others are 
clustered within similar ranges.  
 
One might say that the special purpose transfers effectively address 
deficiencies in “backward” provinces like Tibet and border regions. The rest of the 
transfer system, together with revenue sharing, does indeed result in fairly similar 
levels of spending across the remaining provinces. This may be contrasted with 
Figure 3 for 2000, when the pattern of public spending in the provinces was 
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distinctly unequal, even if the outliers (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Tibet) were to 
be excluded.  
 
 
Table 3 Shifting pattern of transfers 
 
1996 % 2001 % 2008 % 2009 %
Total 271.6 100        517.6 100        2294.6 100        2862.1 100        
as % of local gov expenditures 46.9% 39.4% 38.0% 39.1%
  Tax Return 194.9 71.8       233.5 45.1       428.2 18.7       494.2 17.3       
  General transfer 27.9 10.3       28.1 5.4         869.6 37.9       1132.0 39.6       
  Earmarked transfer 48.8 18.0       256 49.5       996.7 43.4       1235.9 43.2        
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years 
 
 
Figure 7  
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010  
 
 
Within-province differences in public spending and provision of services, 
largely based on rural and urban areas, may be significantly greater than across-
province differences, that are being addressed through the revenue-sharing and 
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transfer mechanisms between the center and the provinces. A greater role for the 
equalization system as the revenue returns are phased out, should allow it to more 
effectively address differentials in revenue capacities and costs of service 
provision—more effectively than a system that is now operating more or less on an 
equal per-capita basis.  The greater rebalancing of resource flows should reduce the 
incentives for out-migration from the more backward, and largely agricultural areas 
to the industrialized coastal regions. 
 
An alternate would be to introduce an equalization system at the sub-
provincial level—e.g., at the third tier. This could be organized by the center 
directly, as in Indonesia, or by the provinces themselves, under the guidance of the 
State Council. However, the complexity of managing a transfer system from Beijing 
directly to the third tier should not be underestimated. 
 
Governance structures 
 
An advantage of the unitary structure of the Chinese legal framework, the center is 
able to establish rules and norm, although as we saw in the case of the 1994 tax 
reforms, considerable care is taken by the center in addressing the interests and 
concerns of the provinces. Although it is in principle feasible for the center to 
abruptly “instruct” the sub-national entities to function in a given manner, this is 
almost never the case, and there is considerable thought given to the consequences 
of specific measures, and some experimentation is normally initiated (as with the 
property tax experiments in Shanghai and Chongqing). But in other cases, regional 
experimentation is not possible—as when system-wide reforms were attempted in 
1994. Budget reforms fall into both categories—where experimentation is possible 
and where it is not. 
 
A difficult reform was the transition to an international standard for the 
budget classification—the use of the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics Manual 
(GFS 2001) for the economic classification and the UN’s COFOG for the functional 
classification. This involved issues relating to budget coverage, as well as having 
implications for budgeting, accounting and reporting and introduces greater 
transparency in public transactions. As is evident, this reform could not be 
introduced in a piece-meal fashion, as it would lead to considerable confusion and 
nonsensical information. The Ministry of Finance implemented the GFS 2001, in 
2007. This now forms the basis for governments at different levels to budget and 
report fiscal revenue and expenditure statistics. 15 
   
The coverage of government has been gradually extended, to conform to the 
logic of the GFS2001 to cover all inflows and outlays that are government in nature, 
including social insurance spending. According to Ministry of Finance rules issued in 
2010, with effect from 2011, all off-budget funds will be shown in budgets “for strict 
                                                        
15 Communication from the Ministry of Finance, February 28, 2011. 
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management, the item “off-budget” is going to disappear in Chinese government 
budgeting.” 16 The critical issue is whether this tighter arrangement will be fully 
implemented. 
 
But could agencies at different levels of government get around these 
strictures, say by establishing “private” activities, such as taxi services with 
government vehicles, or “restaurants” with publicly financed canteens that have 
been reported at all levels of government? This becomes more difficult, of course, 
with a parallel reform—this is the establishment of treasury single accounts (TSA) 
at all levels of government.  Under this reform, all revenues and expenses must pass 
through the TSA—this provides an electronic trail of all fund movements, and it 
would be difficult to “disguise” transactions as “private”.17 
 
According to the communication from the Ministry of Finance, “by the end of 
2010, the (TSA) reform has been fully implemented in all the departments of the 
Chinese central government, 36 provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities 
directly under central government, and cities specially designated in the state plan), 
327 prefectures (cities), and more than 2500 counties (districts). So, more than 
12,500 basic budget units belonging to the central government and more than 0.35 
million local budget units are covered.”18 
 
A consequence of the tighter budget system and TSA reforms is that the 
flexibility enjoyed by local governments (Hussain and Stern, 2008) will be 
considerably reduced, if not eliminated.  Of course, if this tightening of the budget 
framework is accompanied by greater flexibility in terms of raising own-revenues—
e.g., along the lines discussed above—this would engender greater transparency and 
accountability in public operations at the local level. 
 
Local government risks, Investment financing, UDICs  
 
Local governments are not allowed to borrow, under the existing budget law, and 
any debt has to be formally incurred by the center for on-lending to local 
governments. Yet local governments have accumulated around 30 percent of GDP in 
off-budget liabilities (Liu, 2010), indicative of the flexibility that the off-budget 
operations provided local operations. 
 
Local governments have been using land-based transactions to generate 
funds. In particular, land-leasing and bank loans securitized on land and property—
                                                        
16 Communication from Ministry of Finance, February 28, 2011. 
17 The establishment of a TSA is necessary as part of increased transparency, but is 
clearly not sufficient to sufficient to eliminate “handling fees” in dealing with local 
and foreign contracts. This would require closer coordination between the audit and 
tax bureaux. 
18 Ministry of Finance, op cit. 
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accounting for 80-90 percent of infrastructure spending. This has significantly 
added to the pressure on land prices and scarcity. 
 
In addition, the Ministry of Finance issued bonds for local governments as 
part of the fiscal stimulus amounting to $17bn, 2008; $62bn, 2009; $14bn Q1 2010 
(Liu 2010). The questions arises as to who will eventually pay for these and whether 
the liabilities have been factored into the local government’s medium-term budget 
envelopes, given that their ability to generate autonomous own-revenues is quite 
limited.  
 
Urban Development Investment Corporations (UDICs) are springing all over 
country.19 In principle these are not an unwelcome phenomenon, but fall into a grey 
area with an incomplete budget framework law. Some of these are well managed, 
but perhaps not all.20 In addition to loans, the UDICs were financed by public 
instruments, include State bonds on-lent to the local governments, land use rights as 
capital injection; transfer of assets; extra-budgetary municipal fees and charges as 
well as tax credits. There are also instances of on-lending from international 
agencies, issuance of corporate bonds and stocks. 
 
It is clear that the strength of the UDICs is the close linkage with local 
governments and establishment of local priorities, as well as their implicit 
guarantee and backing. But that is also the main weakness, as the local government 
legal and budget framework is not consistent with handling the long-term risks and 
liabilities that might be generated. 
 
Credit ratings agencies are being engaged to evaluate the performance of the 
UDICs in ten provinces.  Yet, systemic risks and liabilities could be created if some of 
the investments begin to go sour, and may have an impact on the stability of the 
financial system--even if there are no explicit guarantees.   
 
Indeed, as seen in the 2011 crisis in Europe, and in the tequila crisis Mexico 
in the 1990s, private sector liabilities that affect the banking system can be quickly 
transformed into public liabilities, even if the public sector initially does not have 
deficits or an apparently unsustainable fiscal position. It is important to realize that 
the fiscal position can become adverse very quickly—and this puts great weight on 
the need to establish information and coordination mechanisms. 
 
It was pointed out in 2003 that there is a need for the MOF, PBC and CBRC to 
build a comprehensive database on local debts and a risk register (see Ahmad et al, 
2003). This indeed seems to have been implemented, and the PBC’s recent “Regional 
Financial Operations Report” suggest that loans to the LGFVs have increased 
                                                        
19 World Bank, The Urban Development Investment Corporations in Chongqing, 
Technical Assistance Report.  
20 IMF, China2010—Article IV Consultation Staff Report, p.27. 
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significantly since 2008, with the numbers of LGFVs increasing 25% to 10,000 and 
the total amount of LGFV debt to around Y14 trillion or around 36% of GDP. 
 
Regulators are reported to be preparing to shift Y2 trillion of the loans from 
the books of 3800 LGFVs to asset management companies. Some part of the loans 
may have to be written off by the banks, and increased provisioning introduced for 
other categories. While these measures are sensible to address the stock of local 
government debt, it is not clear that these will stem further accretions in the future.  
 
Legal framework for sub-national debt and liabilities 
 
Local governments are prohibited from borrowing directly. Yet, there has been a 
loophole permitting borrowing for the operations of UDICs, ostensibly to link 
borrowing to capital spending. Indeed, this creates an incentive for unrestricted 
physical capital investment in infrastructure, but with little focus on the 
sustainability of the spending.  This could generate macroeconomic problems in the 
future.  
 
As in other parts of the world, municipal bond markets would be a useful 
mechanism to channel savings of households, pension funds, and state owned 
enterprises that are permitted by their respective boards, into productive avenues 
of investment. But this would require amending the current prohibition of local 
government borrowing. Also critical are the presence of hard budget constraints, 
involving clarity in spending assignments and access to “own-source” revenues at 
the margin, as well as the provision of information to the market. 
 
Amendments to the budget law are needed to make the process more 
transparent and accountable, and better linked to local priorities and sustainability. 
It should also help to generate a more balanced growth perspective, avoiding the 
current exclusive emphasis on physical infrastructure. Thus would also focus on the 
operations and maintenance aspects of physical investment as well as the human 
capital and manpower needs to sustain the investment, thus ensuring a better 
linkage with the budget process and local priorities. 
 
Ratings for local governments would need to be introduced. As is seen from 
Box 1, which lists the criteria used by Standard and Poor’s, these cover a range of 
interlocking issues. It is possible to implement this reform in an asymmetric 
manner, once the revised legislation has been promulgated. For instance, it is likely 
that Shanghai, Beijing and other large cities may be able to qualify to issuing local 
bonds before others. This source of finance, together with own-source revenues, 
may help to unlock the difficult political economy constraints e.g., to additional tax 
reforms and pensions pooling. For macroeconomic management purposes, a 
register of liabilities at the local level, in addition to actual debt incurred, should be 
provided to the MOF, PBC and CBRC so that they might monitor potential problems 
in a proactive manner.  
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Box 1 Standard and Poor’s Ratings Criteria for Sub-National Governments
• Economic growth:  
– Outlook  
– Degree of diversification 
 
• Intergovernmental fiscal relations: 
– Clarity in Expenditure responsibilities   
– Taxing powers - control over revenue bases and rates 
– Transfers Design and System—extent of Equalization – 
system   
– Borrowing legal framework and regulations 
 
• Sub National budget system: 
– Medium-term budget planning framework 
– Clarity of regulations on fiscal management, accounting and 
reporting 
– Effectiveness of cash management  
– Independent and external audits 
 
• Budgetary performance, debt burden and contingent liabilities: 
– Sound operating balances and sustainable debt structure and 
level 
– Recognition of contingent liabilities including from 
government-owned enterprises 
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III. Elements of a new Fiscal Reform Strategy 
 
The 1994 reforms and the changes were aimed at consolidating the role of the 
central government in a modern economy, and considerable success has been 
achieved in this regard.  The issue of spending assignments was “postponed” as the 
role of the SOEs was still to be clarified, and the restructuring has proceeded apace 
in this regard. The issues involved have less to do with central-provincial 
assignments, with the exception of pensions, but between provinces and lower 
levels of government.  
 
In addition, new own-source revenues are needed at appropriate provincial 
and sub-provincial levels. The main elements of the intergovernmental transfer 
system exist already—both for special purpose central transfers as well as 
equalization transfers. However, it needs to be determined whether the central 
government will make transfers directly to all “responsible” levels of government.  
 
As discussed above, the critical short-term issue is to address the issue of 
sub-national risks and debts. The progress on budget and treasury management 
needs to be consolidated in a new budget law that also tackles the issue of sub-
national debt. This should be transparently determined, along with proper risk 
assessments of the local governments’ investments and operations. The latter in 
turn requires clarity on spending responsibilities and own-source revenues—thus 
the reforms are clearly interlinked. It is also important to be cognizant that the 
private sector liabilities, especially related to property transactions, can be quickly 
translated into public-sector difficulties. There is thus a premium on establishing a 
mechanism for the coordination and management of risks across local 
governments—this has to be at the center, since no one local government will have 
the ability to monitor or handle the potential difficulties. Some of the building blocks 
for the short-term, including the new budget law and coordination mechanisms, as 
well as potential own-taxes (including the piggy-back on the personal income tax, 
property tax and green tax) are described as part of the overall strategy below. 
 
Key elements of the new medium-term strategy, building on both the 1994 
reforms as well as the short-term reforms concerning debt and risk management, 
are discussed below. 
 
1. Spending assignments 
 
In relation to central-provincial spending assignments, the decentralization process 
has not only been maintained, it has grown stronger during the last decade in all 
areas, except social policy (see Table 4). In the latter case, the externalities 
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associated with providing for the aged have not only intertemporal but also spatial 
implications, and it is appropriate for the central government to play a bigger role, 
as we discuss below (see also Ahmad, Li and Richardson, 2001). 
 
With respect to “local” spending (which refers to all sub-central levels), the 
share has increased from 69 percent in 2000 to 80 percent overall—with significant 
increases in education and health case, as well as transportation. Even in the case of 
social spending (pensions and unemployment benefits, for example) the share 
remains above 90 percent, although the center has appropriately begun to play a 
larger role. 
 
At the provincial level, for the main spending areas: social safety nets, 
education and health care, the highest spending in each case is for Shanghai and 
Beijing (see Figure 8)—reflecting their higher resources, as well as cost of provision 
for an ageing population (with the highest dependency ratios in the country).  The 
higher per capita spending in Tibet, and also the poorer provinces (like Qinghai) 
reflects need factors and also likely higher cost of provision, and suggests an 
appropriate design of the special program and equalization transfer system, as 
discussed above. 
 
 
Table 4 China: Changing sub-national share in spending, 2000-2009 
 
 Local 
2009 
Local 
2000 
Total 80% 69% 
Transportation 77% 66% 
Education 95% 89% 
Health care 98% 90% 
Social 94% 99% 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010. 
 
 
The variance in aggregate provincial level is far less than at the sub-
provincial level and quality of actual provision of services may be far worse. Dollar 
and Hofman (2008) using World Bank data for 2006 on the investment climate 
argued that the per capita spending in the richest county was 48 times as high as 
that in the poorest.  It would be interesting to explore how this pattern has changes, 
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e.g., through assessments of different provinces, as practices within provinces may 
vary considerably. Significant issues may arise in the traditional urban-rural divide, 
as well as in the provision for the most vulnerable groups of the population. 
 
 
Figure  8 
 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010. 
  
 
2. Telescoping budgetary pressures at the local levels 
 
In the earlier part of this paper, we had noted the increasing budgetary pressure at 
the local level, particularly in recent years (see Figure 2). This results in telescoping 
pressures the lowest levels, as central resources tend to stick to the highest tiers of 
local governments. While the urban areas were able to fall back on indirect 
borrowing, e.g., through UDICs, effectively unfunded mandates, and inadequate 
sources of revenues led to pressures at the lowest rural levels for ad hoc fees and 
charges that were regressive and distortive. And in order to collect such fees and 
charges, additions to the local bureaucracy were inevitably resorted to. Given 
political unrest, the central government responded by replacing the fees and 
charges by an agricultural tax to be accompanied by administrative downsizing—
but this tended to be resisted by the local bureaucratic interests (Li 2006).   
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Despite the tax for fee reform, there was little downsizing and the pressures 
continued, as did the unrest. The central government reacted by eliminating rural 
taxes altogether in 2006, and replacing these by central transfers. Three problems 
arise with this structure—(1) higher-level transfers cannot substitute for the locally 
generated resources, given the limitations of funds: “the appetite in the localities for 
central transfers is insatiable… central coffers cannot fill up a bottomless pit” (Li, 
2006, p.65). This is also corroborated in an assessment after the agricultural tax was 
abolished (Tao and Qin, 2007). This is partly due to the incentives for the higher 
levels to pass through fewer resources than intended at the local levels, and the 
timing of central transfers is often not adequately determined even to the provinces. 
A more difficult issue relates to the incentives for local bureaucracies to divert the 
central transfers to paying for their salaries and benefits, and not necessarily to the 
provision of services.  
 
How would it be possible to provide incentives for better local governance, and 
possible applications of the insights of “yardstick” competition? The first element 
relates to improved transparency on the flow of funds and the results of the 
spending—and the current budget and treasury reforms go a long way in doing this. 
But this is not likely to be sufficient in a country of the size and sophistication of 
China.  It is clearly important to align local incentives through clarity in 
responsibility for public spending and outcomes and who is responsible. Moreover, 
some own-source taxation at the margin, however limited, is critical in getting 
communities and local populations to scrutinize the outcomes of the spending. 
 
3. Rationalizing levels of government and responsibilities 
The current 5-level administrative structure poses difficulties in assigning 
responsibilities and holding officials accountable. Under the aegis of the NDRC, a 
multi-province experiment to rationalize the levels of government has been initiated 
(e.g., experimented in Jiangsu). In principle a three-tier arrangement would 
facilitate: 
 Greater clarity in spending assignments—lower levels (existing fourth or 
fifth levels) could act as “agents” of the third level. 
 Possible assignment of “own-source revenues” at the second and third levels 
of government. 
 
Spending is likely to be higher in rich coastal regions (Shanghai), due to 
demographics and costs; and in remote and sparsely populated regions with poor 
infrastructure (Tibet, Qinghai). A U-shape cost curve on the basis of need is seen in 
the latest figures. However, a significant agenda remains. 
 
Perhaps the most difficult reassignment that remains on the spending side 
relates to pooling of pension funds. Local pools that have grown in importance and 
magnitude bestow influence on local officials, who may be suspicious of the manner 
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in which benefits may be administered in neighbouring jurisdictions, hence loth to 
part with control over the resources.  
 
Part of the difficulty lies apparently in the mistrust of lax collections of premia in 
other cities/regions. Similarly, in the interior provinces with younger demographic 
profiles, officials are not keen to pay for PAYG pensions in richer coastal areas. 
Perhaps the mistrust could be assuaged by centralized collections of payroll premia, 
e.g., by SAT, even if provincial pooling is envisaged—although if there is to be 
provincial pooling there could easily be pooling at the central level. In addition to 
the credibility concerns there are issues relating to the likely flow of resources as 
the younger, perhaps poorer cohorts from the interior finance, on a PAYG basis, the 
retirement of richer, older cohorts in the coastal region. For this reason, placing this 
reform within an equalization framework is essential in order to get political 
acceptability. 
 
The development of individual retirement accounts, or even effective investment 
of local or provincial pools would be facilitated if there were local bonds and a 
municipal bond market. The preconditions for this are quite stringent and not all 
local governments would qualify. Thus the linkages with budgetary reforms would 
be quite important. 
 
With the ageing of the population, that will begin to affect the more prosperous 
and presumably better managed coastal regions, it may be in their longer-term 
interests to move towards a national pooling of risks and efficiency of management. 
However, given the nexus of short-term gains and losses and the limited own-source 
resources that are now available to local governments, the pension reform has to 
be clearly part of a “package” that includes both assignment changes, transfers 
and access to own-source funding, including credit. 
4. Financing—transfer design 
While responsibilities for education and health care are largely devolved to local 
governments, the key issues relate to effective service delivery within provinces, 
and whether there should be national standards and whether these should be 
financed by own- or shared-revenues, supplemented by equalization transfers, or 
whether there should be special purpose transfers directly to provinces or 
counties/urban districts.  If infrastructure gaps can be identified, an issue that arises 
is whether the equalization framework, based on spending needs and revenue 
capacities should be extended to capital transfers within “equalization framework”, 
along the lines of recent theoretical developments and practice in countries such as 
Spain. 
 
It is clear that the design of spending assignments will need to be linked with the 
transfer system. The equalization framework is already in place, but the amounts to 
be transferred, and whether the equalization is at the provincial or county levels, 
and whether the system will cover both current and capital spending, are the key 
issues to be determined. Further, the interactions and scope of earmarked transfers 
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and centrally directed spending will also need to be calibrated for specific policy 
packages. 
5. Financing—tax reforms 
 
Despite significant progress in establishing a modern tax system in 1994, and since 
then, China has still some way to go, especially on income tax reforms, completing 
the VAT reforms, and possible new initiatives with relation to green/carbon taxes. 
Most importantly, significant rethinking about options for own-revenues at the 
subnational level is needed, linked to the budget and accountability reforms that are 
underway.  
 
Linking taxation and spending, at sub-national level, is important in creating 
the incentives for more efficiency and better accountability. Options for own-source 
revenues provinces, in addition to simplified shared revenues, could be defined 
given international best practices. Similarly, non-distortionary options for the third 
tier could be examined, largely based on more significant moves towards property 
taxation. 
 
The next stages of tax reforms could focus initially on which instruments 
have relatively underdeveloped yields, but also examining ease of collection, and 
effects on production incentives (Ahmad and Stern 1991). To the extent that 
distributional objectives can be met through social programs, there is less need to 
provide special exemptions or preferences for distributional purposes in the tax 
structure, and the joint tax-transfer system should be examined for welfare and 
growth enhancing directions.21 
 
We summarize the possible options for tax reforms for consideration by the 
Chinese authorities as follows: 
a. The Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
Perhaps the greatest potential for additional revenues arises from the PIT, given 
China’s rising incomes. It is desirable to keep the tax law relatively simple, with a 
reasonable exemption limit, a limited number of rates and top marginal rate 
synchronized with the CIT. 
 
The PIT could also provide an excellent own-source revenue base for 
provincial (second tier) governments, if the authorities were to move from the 
revenue sharing principle to a “piggy-backed arrangement.” Under this model, the 
provinces would be authorized by State Council legislation to levy up to 5 
percentage points on the central PIT liability, but the administration would continue 
                                                        
21 An empirical and policy oriented assessment between design of social programs 
at different levels of government in China, and the appropriate measures for 
financing through taxation are part of a current research agenda at the Asia 
Research Center of the LSE. 
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to be by the SAT. The current incremental sharing arrangements would be 
abolished. Taxpayers would use the same base, and file either a single return 
showing provincial PIT due, or separate returns to central and provincial treasuries.  
 
As the piggy-backed arrangement would favour rich provinces such as Shanghai 
and Beijing, the equalization framework would need to be recalibrated to reflect the 
changes over the status quo. 
 
b. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 
 
The 2007 reforms leading to an integration, standardization and consolidation of 
the base, are consistent with international best practice, and the tendency of CIT 
regimes to converge, given the mobility of capital flows. Existing preferences are 
grandfathered, and new preferences are standardized and simplified. The 
establishment of a common 25 percent tax rate is also appropriate. Dividend and 
investment policies should be determined by the respective provincial or central 
boards of directors of specific companies to address transitional windfall gains for 
SOEs. Blanket rules for SOEs approximating a reintroduction of higher rates should 
be avoided.  
 
A simple revenue-sharing arrangement between the center and provinces for the 
CIT would be appropriate (although, as in the United States, some apportionment 
will be necessary given the problem of headquarters based filing of returns), 
replacing the current complex earmarking of incremental incomes. Alternatively, a 
piggy-backed arrangement, similar to that proposed for the PIT, could be 
considered. Again, given that richer provinces would likely benefit from either 
option, a linkage with a recalibration of the equalization framework would be 
essential. 
 
c. Completing VAT reforms 
The recent reforms moving from an investment to a consumption-type VAT were 
needed to remove the bias against exporters as the exchange rate strengthened. 
However, this would have led to revenue losses, and the middle-income provinces 
may have suffered more than others as a result of the current revenue-sharing 
arrangement on a derivation basis. 
 
The next stage of the VAT reforms is clearly more difficult, as it would replace 
the local business tax.  While the reform would significantly enhance VAT revenues, 
the losses incurred by provinces would need to be compensated, either by varying 
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the sharing percentages or changes in the overall financing of equalization transfers.  
22  
 
The complexity in dual or multi-level VATs between the center and the 
provinces, as in India or Brazil should be avoided. China has the makings of an 
efficient VAT instrument, administered by the SAT, and this should not be 
dissipated—as there are other instruments that would provide better own-tax 
handles for the lower levels of government. At most, a modified sharing 
arrangement could be considered. 
 
If revenue-sharing is maintained, a simplified sharing mechanism would be 
appropriate.  Straightforward sharing on derivation basis tends to benefit producing 
provinces, as the credits and refunds given across provinces tend to be ignored, and 
there is a danger that more could be given away than actually collected. A statistical 
sharing on the basis of “consumption” would be closer to the true basis for a VAT. 
d. Property taxes 
Proper property taxation forms an appropriate own-source base for county (third) 
level administrations.  Again, given that China is a unitary state, the State Council 
could legislate the appropriate band that could be chosen by a specific county or 
municipality. 
 
The issues that arise include the level at which the cadaster should be 
maintained—the provincial (second) tier, or the municipal (third) tier. There are 
arguments in favour of a uniform practice and historical valuations to be maintained 
at a higher level to prevent “game” play at the third (municipal) level. However, in 
cases where transaction values are also maintained, this may be best done at the 
third level. The current experimentation building up information on transactions (IT 
system in Shanghai on assessed base, extensions to Chongqing on transaction 
values) should provide useful experience. 
 
While overall revenues of the property tax are likely to be modest in relation to 
the total revenue potential in PR China, this base is likely to be quite important for 
the third tier governments, and also critical in establishing own-source revenues for 
ratings and debt management purposes. 
e. Consideration of agricultural tax (with exemption limit) 
 
While the abolition of the agricultural tax was designed to remove irritants and 
“exploitation” of small farmers, it does provide windfall gains for larger farmers and 
those with more valuable properties. Consideration could be given to reintroducing 
                                                        
22 In Australia, the VAT reform was made feasible by replacing the mechanisms to 
finance equalization through the budget, by placing the entire amount of the VAT 
revenues into the equalization pool. 
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the agricultural tax on more valuable holdings above a minimum threshold, to 
mimic the income tax rules. 
f. Green taxes 
 
Given the need to protect the environment, and to encourage more efficient use of 
energy, a generalized green or carbon tax could be considered.  The revenues 
generated, which could be substantial, would create resources that could be used 
partly for industrial restructuring, and to compensate the poorest households as 
there would be a likely change in relative prices as the new tax is introduced.  
 
A proposal by Ahmad and Stern (2011) for India suggested that the 
administration of a green tax should be central, as it is important to prevent local 
governments from ‘playing games’ with the tax to attract investments, and that a 
level playing field for this tax is important.  A compensation mechanism linked to 
the special purpose transfer mechanism for firms and households may be easier to 
design and manage at the central level. 
 
6. Transfer mechanisms 
 
The modern transfer mechanisms are in place in China—both special purpose 
transfers as well as equalization transfers are used. The revenue-returns are 
gradually being phased out and more resources are available for the equalization 
purposes that are clearly beginning to have an impact on regional imbalances. Both 
tax reforms and redesign of spending assignments will have a further impact on the 
transfer system, and the balance between special purpose and equalization 
transfers and a recalibration of the latter will be needed. 
 
However, the existing instruments for transfers and framework are largely 
suitable. Possible extensions of the equalization framework are towards the third 
tier of counties and municipalities, and to capital transfers for education and health 
care in particular. More resources may be available as the revenue-returned is 
phased out, the VAT reform is completed, or a green tax introduced. 
 
7. Governance—consolidating budget reforms and managing local liabilities 
and risks 
 
The progress with budget system and treasury reforms will tighten the flexibility 
available to local governments.  We have discussed own-tax revenues above, and a 
key element in putting local governments on a modern footing is to bring the 
management of assets and liabilities, especially for pensions, and provisioning for 
public-related risks of local governments explicitly onto the budget. 
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The key extension of the budget framework would be to permit local 
governments to access capital markets provided they meet certain criteria (own-
source revenues, and modern management systems for assets and liabilities). The 
development of municipal bond markets will help to channel growing household, 
pension and firm level savings into well-defined and productive directions. There 
may well be asymmetric solutions that evolve, as the more advanced 
provinces/municipalities may be able to meet the necessary preconditions much 
earlier than others.  A new budget law should formalize local borrowing, but set out 
the necessary preconditions in terms of stock and flow criteria, development of 
own-source revenues (e.g., as being attempted in Shanghai and Chongqing), and 
sanctions for failing to meet needed criteria. 
 
There also needs to be strengthened MOF/PBC oversight over sub-national 
budgets and local risk generation, as systemic risks can arise from the private sector 
even if there are no guarantees—as has been seen in Latin America over the past 
couple of decades, as well as recently in Europe. The current intergovernmental 
framework could distort local preferences in unsustainable ways, by emphasizing 
physical infrastructure to the detriment of maintenance spending, or human capital 
requirements—a proper framework would synchronize current and capital 
spending. 
  
In conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the 1994 reforms were remarkably successful in stabilizing the 
economy and laying the foundations for the growth and poverty reduction that have 
been seen since then.  The criticisms that the process was disequalizing (Qiao, 
Martinez-Vasquez and Xu, 2008) miss the point that the growth could not have been 
sustained had the equalization framework introduced in 1994 been fully 
implemented at that time. It would have shifted resources abruptly to regions that 
would not have been able to use them effectively, and led to a sharp reduction in 
growth, but with more equal distribution across regions. It is likely that the 
reduction in poverty would not have been as remarkable as has been seen since 
1994. 
 
Now that the infrastructure has been established to move growth generation 
inland, it is appropriate that the Chinese government is giving greater room for 
“equalization”—this again builds on an instrument that was introduced in 1994—
the system of equalization transfers. As mentioned, some consideration may need to 
be given to an additional equalization at the third tier of government, as in 
Indonesia. 
 
The fiscal infrastructure has also been developed to an extent that was not 
available in 1994—this includes both the SAT and the budget and treasury systems. 
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Here again, work is needed, including on short-term measures to address the 
potential local government and private sector debt difficulties. A deepening of the 
tax reforms, as well as the budget management as well as coordination and 
information mechanisms suggest that there will need to be a continuous building on 
sound foundations.  
 
As shown in 1994, a deepening of some of the more difficult tax reforms will 
require the same political economy wisdom that was shown at that time—and 
necessitates a combination of instruments to ensure that there is political buy-in for 
the additional measures needed. Although a comprehensive review is needed, in 
spirit, the 1994 reforms remain the basis for the continued prosperity of China. 
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